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Abstract
A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states
that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the
equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here
I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players
have social preferences of the form frequently assumed in the recent
literature, for example in the inequity aversion models of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In fact, repeating
the unique stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame perfect
equilibrium at all.
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1 Introduction
A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that
if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of
the stage game is being played in every period. This result has been much
used in applied theory, in particular in industrial organization with the most
prominent example being the chain—store paradox of Selten (1980). It is also
frequently being invoked in experimental economics when a stage game is
played amongst the same set of players for a finite number of periods.
The purpose of this note is to point out that the result described above
does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the
form frequently assumed in the recent literature, for example in the inequity
aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).1
In fact, repeating the unique stage game equilibrium may not be a subgame
perfect equilibrium at all in some examples. The logic is simple. In the
standard case of selfish preferences, payoﬀs are separable across periods in
the sense that the optimal choice in the last period does not depend on
anything that has happened in previous periods. For most models of social
preferences, this no longer holds. What has happened in previous periods
influences the relative payoﬀs and therefore also the optimal choice in the last
period, which makes it impossible to treat the last period as independent from
the rest of the game.2
2 Examples
Example 1 (Dictator game) As a simple illustration consider the following
example of a dictator game with three options for the proposer: (0 100)
(40 40), (100 0), where  in ( ) denotes the the amount of money allocated
1See also Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for an extensive discussion.
2In other words, the game is now a stochastic game. This insight seems to be some
kind of folk wisdom in the literature. It has also been pointed out recently in Hu (2010).
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to the dictator and  denotes the amount of money allocated to the other
player, the recipient. Choose a model of social preferences and parametrize
it such that the proposer ranks (40 40) Â (100 0) º (0 100) Assume further
that preferences are monotone in the sense that ( ) Â ( ) for   .
Clearly, the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is to allocate the
money (40 40). However, in the twice repeated game there are two subgame
perfect equilibria (SPE) that yield the sequence of allocations (100 0) →
(0 100) or (0 100) → (100 0) respectively. Since (100 100) Â (80 80), re-
peating the unique stage game equilibrium twice is not a SPE of the repeated
game.
Example 2 (Trust game) Consider a 5 times repeated trust game. The
stage game payoﬀs of the investor and the trustee are (   ) = (2 0) if the
investor does not invest. If he invests, the trustee can split the pie equally
(4 4) or keep everything for himself (0 8). Suppose players are inequity
averse but not too strongly if it is to their advantage. In particular, suppose
that (2 0) Â (0 8) (8 8) Â (10 0), (8 8) Â ( ) if   8  . In all zero—
sum choices the trustee likes to have more rather than less: ( −  ) Â
(−0 0) for all and   0.3 The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
the stage game entails no investment. Yet, all subgame perfect equilibria of
the 5 times repeated game entail investment in one of the 5 rounds. Suppose
there was no investment in the first 4 rounds. By investing in the last round,
the investor can equalize average payoﬀs to (8 8) which is preferred by him
to (10 0), which would result from not investing in the last period.
Example 3 (Ultimatum game) Consider a twice repeated ultimatum
game, in which the proposer ( ) can make oﬀers of  ∈ [0 100] to the re-
sponder (). Suppose the responder is known to be inequity averse and his
preferences on the total payoﬀ allocations (Π Π) are such that (150 50) ∼
(70 30) ∼ (0 0).4 Thus, in a stage game, the responder will reject any oﬀer
3These assumptions would be satisfied, for example, in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model if   02 and   05 in equation (2) below.
4This assumption is compatible with Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) ERC model that
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  30. For a proposer, who is supposed to care only about his own payoﬀ,
the unique best reply is to choose  = 30. Hence, the SPE of the stage game
results in  = 30 which is accepted by the responder. However, in the twice
repeated game the proposer’s optimal action is to oﬀer 1 = 30 in the first
period and 2 = 20 in the second. Both are accepted by the responder. But
this implies that oﬀering the stage game equilibrium proposal of 30 in both
periods is not a SPE.
3 Model and main result
In the following I shall consider a (normal form) stage game  = { ()
()},5 where  = 1   is the set of players,  is a set of pure actions
for player  and ( −) is player ’s payoﬀ function given his action and
the action profile of all other players −. An  ∈  := × is referred to
as an outcome of . The finitely repeated game ( ) results when  is
successively played  times and players are informed about the outcome 
after each period .
The crucial assumption is how players evaluate the outcome sequences
() ∈  . We assume that player  evaluates () according to his total
payoﬀ,
Π :=
X
=1
() (1)
When applying the theory to social preferences, there are (at least) two
possibilities of how to evaluate payoﬀs. Given that in finitely repeated games
(and in almost all experiments) the payoﬀs are paid out to players at the end
of the game, it seems reasonable that players should evaluate an outcome
sequence () based on the profile of total payoﬀs of all players, (Π).
requires that  is strictly increasing in Π for given  (see equation (3) below) since
(140 60) Â (70 30). The assumption would not be compatible with Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) preferences.
5With slight modifications the analysis can also be applied to sequential stage games
with a unique SPE.
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Assumption 1 Social preferences in a finitely repeated game can be repre-
sented by a utility function (ΠΠ−)
Likewise, one can assume that  depends on average payoﬀs, 1
P
=1 (),
which does not aﬀect the main results.6 The crucial feature is that payoﬀs
for each player are first aggregated over periods and then compared across
players. An alternative way would be to assume that payoﬀs are compared
period by period without allowing for compensation across periods. This as-
sumption is sometimes made for infinite games (see Duﬀy andMonoz—Garcia,
2010), however mainly for reasons of tractability. It seems less reasonable
for the case of finitely repeated games. After all, why should a player fail to
consider the payoﬀs from diﬀerent periods as substitutes when in the end all
that matters is the total payoﬀ he takes home?
Several prominent social preference models can be applied in accordance
with Assumption 1. The inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
can be specified as
(ΠΠ−) = Π− 1− 1
X
 6=
max [Π −Π 0]− 1− 1
X
 6=
max [Π −Π 0] 
(2)
with 0 ≤   1 and  ≤ .
The model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) can be written as
(ΠΠ−) =  (Π )  (3)
where  := ΠP ΠBolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that  is strictly
concave in  and assumes a maximum for givenΠ if  = 1. Furthermore,
for given ,  is strictly increasing in Π.
6In experiments, sometimes a third way of paying subjects is used, namely paying
one randomly chosen period. In this case, one has to make assumptions about how social
preferences interact with risk (see Trautmann, 2009 and Fudenberg and Levine, 2011). The
current discussion applies only if social preferences are assumed to depend on the expected
value of the resulting lottery (as in Trautmann’s “process Fehr-Schmidt” model).
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Charness and Rabin (2002) assume a payoﬀ function of the form
(ΠΠ−) = (1− )Π + 
"
min{Π1 Π}+ (1− )
X

Π
#

(4)
Finally, models of linear altruism or spite can be written as
(ΠΠ−) =
X

Π (5)
For selfish preferences, the following result is well known (see e.g. Propo-
sition 157.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).7 It is instructive to follow the
steps of its proof to see why the result breaks down for most forms of social
preferences. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Suppose further that (· ·) is a
linear mapping and hence
(ΠΠ−) = 
Ã X
=1
()
X
=1
−()
!
=
X
=1
(() −()) (6)
Obviously, (6) is satisfied if  is given by (1) or (5) but not if it is given
by (2), (3), or (4). This is the reason why for most of the popular social
preference models the following proposition does not hold.
Proposition 1 Suppose payoﬀs in ( ) are evaluated by a utility function
(ΠΠ−) that satisfies (6). If the strategic game  has a unique Nash equi-
librium payoﬀ profile, then for any value of  the action profile chosen after
any history in any subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ) is a Nash equilibrium
of .
If (· ·) is non—linear (e.g. because of the strict concavity with respect to
 in the model of Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, or the max—operators in the
7As Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definition 137.1) point out, the crucial assumption
for the standard result is “weak separability” of preferences.
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model of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the naive application of the backward—
induction argument fails.
Proof. Consider the optimal action in period  . If (6) holds, then
argmax

(ΠΠ−) = argmax
X
=1
(() −())
= argmax

(( ) −( ))
The optimization problem in the second line is the same as the one in the
stage game. This implies that players’ payoﬀs in  are independent of the
history of play. Thus, in all subgames of ( ) starting in period  , the
outcome is a Nash equilibrium of . Therefore, also in all subgames starting
in period  − 1, the outcome is a Nash equilibrium of . The result follows
then by induction. ¤
I have emphasized so far the application of the result to partner or fixed
matchings in experimental games because it is in this context where Proposi-
tion 1 is usually invoked — incorrectly as we see now when social preferences
are being considered. However, even with random or stranger matching,
problems can occur with the application of social preferences to repeated in-
teraction. To see this consider again Example 1 and let there be four players,
two proposers (P1,P2) and two receivers (R1,R2). In the first period, P1 is
matched with R1 and P2 with R2. In the second period, P1 is matched with
R2 and P2 with R1.
This stranger matching procedure is usually seen as a method that al-
lows to treat each match as an independent observation, essentially as a
one—shot game. However, with social preferences this need not be the case
anymore. Suppose players evaluate average payoﬀs according to the ERC
model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) given in (3). In the one—shot game,
both proposers will split (40,40) if they are suﬃciently inequity averse. In
the twice repeated game however, all SPE are of the form (100 0)→ (0 100)
or (0 100)→ (100 0) This is because players have a trade—oﬀ between their
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own payoﬀ and the ratio of their payoﬀ to the sum of all players’ payoﬀs. If
the latter is suﬃciently important, the claim follows.8
Thus, when applying social preference models to finitely repeated games,
care has to be taken. It will depend on the specifics of the game whether the
—fold repetition of the unique stage game equilibrium is still a SPE of the
repeated game.
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